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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PRECEDING
Appellants are Carroll C- and Shirley Nichols,
husband and wife who filed separate claims in an Amended
Complaint as Third Party Plaintiffs against Second Third Party
Defendant State of Utah, Appellee.
First Interstate Bank of Utah filed the original
action against Carroll C. Nichols on a note, but is not a
party to this appeal.

C & G Transportation Corporation

previously filed for bankruptcy and is not a party to this
appeal.
This appeal is by each Third Party Plaintiff on
their individual judgments against Second Third Party
Defendant State of Utah granted by the Third District Court on
May 31, 1990.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked by Appellants
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1953).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Plaintiff Shirley Nichols Was Not Entitled, as
a Matter of Law, to a Claim of Loss
Representing One-Half Interest in Checks Paid
From the Joint Family Bank Account in the
Alleged Amount of $39,692.46.
1

The standard for review is that Plaintiff must show
that the factor determinations of the trial court were
"clearly erroneous".
II.

Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff Shirley Nichols is not Entitled to
Prejudgment Interest.
A,

The Unfair Competition in Ridesharing Act
does not allow for prejudgment interest.

The standard of review is that the Plaintiffs must
show that the trial court was incorrect in its determinations.
Carter v. Utah Power & Light, 146 U.A.R. 7 (Utah 1990).
B.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment
interest even if allowable under the
unfair competition in ride sharing act.

The standard of review is that the Plaintiffs must
show the trial court's determination was "clearly erroneous",
because of the factual determinations of the trial court that
pre-judgment interest is inappropriate and Plaintiffs' claims
too speculative.

Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

III. The Claim by Plaintiff Shirley Nichols For
$58,077.64, as Set Forth in Point III of
Plaintiff's Brief (p. 31) is a Non-Meritless
Claim to be Ignored by This Court as Having
Been First Raised on Appeal, and Further
Misrepresented as an Alleged Binding Admission
and Commitment by the State.
This claim is raised for the first time on appeal,
and therefore, there is no standard of review.

To the extent

it seems to overrule the trial court's factor determination of
2

loss, the standard of review is that the Plaintiffs must show
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous.

Rule

52, Utah R. Civ. P,
IV.

Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Judgment
Interest From June 20, 1988.
This issue was not raised below as it deals with

post-judgment interest, and therefore there is no standard of
review.
V.

The Legislation Precludes any Recovery in
Excess of $125,000 by Statute as a Recovery
From the State on the Judgment Granted
Plaintiff Carroll C. Nichols May 31, 1990.
The standard of review is that the Plaintiffs must

show that the trial court was incorrect in its determination
of legislative intent.

Carter v. Utah Power & Light, 146 Utah

Admin. R. 6 (Utah 1990).
VI.

Plaintiff's Judgments Should be Reversed as
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (1986) is
Unconstitutional Special Legislation Prohibited
by Article VI, Section 26, Utah Constitution,
The standard of review is that the State must show

that the trial court was incorrect in not finding the
legislation unconstitutional as special legislation.

Carter

v. Utah Power & Light, 146 Utah Admin. R. 6 (Utah 1990).

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGUIATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (1986):
(1)

As used in this section:

(a) "Common motor carrier of passengers" means a
person, partnership, or corporation which has been
granted a certificate of convenience and necessity
by the Public Service Commission under Chapter 6,
Title 54.
(b)

"Vanpool" means a mode of transportation where:
(i) more than six but not more than 15 persons,
including the driver, ride together in a motor
vehicle;
(ii) the transportation is incidental to
another purpose of the driver; and
(iii) the vehicle manufacturer's design
capacity of any seat is not exceeded.

(c) "Unfair competition" means conduct which
injures the legitimate business of a common carrier
of passengers by charging prices lower than the
tariffs approved for certificated carriers, except
that this conduct is not unfair competition if the
tariff rates are shown to be in excess of fair
charges for the services in question.
(2) A common motor carrier of passengers which
suffers losses by reason of unfair competition from
vanpools as a result of the enactment of and
operations under Chapter 11, Title 54, regarding
ridesharing, may upon successful adjudication
recover from the state the amount of those losses
but not any expected profits; but such recovery
shall not exceed $125,000 per claim.
(3) Any person, partnership, or corporation, who
extended credit to any common motor carrier and who
suffered losses by reason of the unfair competition
as referred to in Subsection (2) may upon successful
4

adjudication recover from the state
those losses not exceeding $125,000
long as payment or judgment for the
been made or obtained prior to suit

the amount of
per claim so
losses has not
on those claims.

(4) This section applies to claims arising prior to
March 29, 1984 if those claims are filed in the
manner required in the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act and within four years after the cause of action
arises.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Proceeding
This is a statutory cause of action under the Unfair
Competition in Ridesharing Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-5-2.3
(1986).

The Defendant/Third Party Plaintiffs Carroll C.

Nichols and Shirley Nichols (hereinafter "Plaintiffs" seek
recovery as persons into extended credit to a common motor
carrier (C 8c G Transportation Corp., not a party to this
appeal) for their "losses" by reason of unfair competition
from van pools.
Course of Proceedings
Plaintiffs brought this third party action against
the State after being sued by First Interstate Bank of Utah in
1985.

Trial was held on Plaintiffs' claims on March 22nd and

23rd, 1988, and judgment was entered in favor of both
Plaintiffs on a single claim for $125,000.00 on June 20, 1988.
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Utah Court of Appeals,
5

which remanded once for further Findings of Fact on the issue
of "joint" versus "separate" claims.

After amended findings

were entered, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on
the grounds that the record did not support the finding of a
single "joint" claim, and remanded for further proceeding
consistent with their opinion.

See Addendum at

•

After remand, the trial court entered extensive
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's
Claims,

See Addendum at

-

On May 31, 1990, judgments

were entered in favor of each Plaintiff against the State of
Utah for sums certain (Carroll Nichols, $125,000-00; Shirley
Nichols, $41,485-57), together with costs and interest "as
provided by law".

On June 29, 1990, both Plaintiffs appealed

their judgments.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1-

The State of Utah, Appellee, accepts as a

partial Statement of Facts the paragraphs of Appellants'
Statement of Facts numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12,
16, 17, 18, and 19.

The State of Utah sets forth, as the

facts involved herein, the findings of the trial Court, set
forth in the Addendum at 2.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
•I.- . Plaintiff Shirley Nichols Was Not En I i t I * "d , .1:,
a Matter of Law, to a Claim of Loss
Representing One-Half Interest in Checks Paid
From the Joint Family Bank Account in the
Alleged Amount of $39,692.46.
The trial court found that Plaintiff Shirley Nichols
did not suffer as a loss an amount represent aui
the joint family bank account.

;,•-->..•;

>f

That finding is based upon

substantial (tv i done*•,, in t.he record, after a scrupulous review
of the evidence by the trial court.

Plaintiff fails to

demonstrate that the finding was clearly erroneous,
TT

Plaintiff Shirley Nich • •t
Prejudgment Interest.
A,

iiiiLxLled to

The Unfair Competition in Ridesharing Act
does not allow for prejudgment interest,

The Utah legislature intended fh*" unfair competition
in Ridesharing Act to provide a limited recovery of the
damages of ti le PJ aintiffs.
claim and total amount,

Recovery was limited by type of

Prejudgment

interest , which is in the

nature of claim for loss of business opportunity or
prospect!''- > ad/v antage, is not allowed under the act..
Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment
interest even if allowable under the
unfair competition in ride sharing act.
If allowed undci

t ho act f prejudgment, interest is

appropriate only if Plaintiffs' claims
7

IM

:IX^

measurable by facts and figures with mathematical certainty.
Plaintiffs' claims, in this case, were subject to
discretionary analysis and were, in essence, unliquidated plan
to judgment.

Therefore, the trial court properly determined

that pre-judgment interest was inappropriate.
III. The Claim by Plaintiff Shirley Nichols For
$58,077.64, as Set Forth in Point III of
Plaintiff's Brief (p. 31) is a Non-Meritless
Claim to be Ignored by This Court as Having
Been First Raised on Appeal, and Further
Misrepresented as an Alleged Binding Admission
and Commitment by the State.
Plaintiffs have attempted to take a statement made
by the State's counsel during final argument as a conclusive
statement of the amount of damages.

The trial court's factual

finding - which differed from counsel's statement - was not
clearly erroneous.

Further, the statement did not bind the

State.
Finally, this claim was not raised by the Plaintiffs
below, and they are barred from raising it for the first time
on appeal.
IV.

Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Judgment
Interest From June 20, 1988.
Plaintiffs obtained an initial judgment against the

State on June 20, 1988, which judgment was reversed by the
Court of Appeals on February 21, 1990.
8

The reversal of the

judgment rendered it d

n« • further force of effect, and

Plaintiffs are on .

In nidqiiWMi 1 i mini os t

from the date of their current judgment - May 31,
V

:* at all,
- -K

The Legislation Precludes any Recovery in
Excess of $125,000 by Statute as a Recovery
From the State on the Judgment Granted
Plaintiff Carroll r Nichols May ^
1 Q t ^.
The State Legislature passed the statute to benefit

the Plaintiffs, whose claim was known t > •• uwh,i.
$165,000-

n: :; *

The legislature decided to limit claims to o-.-y

certain Ly; •-• •*

J i-: o limit total recovery to

$125,000, rather than allow complete compensati mi !< the
Plaintiffs for all damages.
VI.

Plaintiff's Judgments Should be Reversed as
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (1986) is
Unconstitutional Special Legislation Prohibited
by Article VI, Section 26, Utah Constitution.
In p a s s i i tg t l le Ui if a i r Competi - • •• • u R i d e s h a r i n g A c t

(§13-5-2.3) the legislature knew and believed that the act
only applied to the Plaintiffs, notwithstanding its general
language.

As siicl: i ,

i 1 : const::! tuted spec! a] ] egi s "I. J t * o:,

prohibited by the IJtah Constitution.
judgments cannot be sustained.

9

Therefore, Piaj.ir ii»:

ARGUMENT
!•-. " SHIRLEY NICHOLS WAS NOT ENTITLED, AS A MATTER
OF LAW, TO ANY AMOUNT REPRESENTING ONE-HALF
INTEREST IN CHECKS PAID FROM THE JOINT FAMILY
BANK ACCOUNT IN THE ALLEGED AMOUNT OF
$39,692.46.
The Appellant, Shirley Nichols, is clearly in error
when she states that the trial record shows no evidence that
these losses were not solely losses to Carroll Nichols.

On

the contrary, the trial record is replete with evidence that
most of the proceeds that went into the family bank account
(the monies from the second mortgage on their home and the
family trust monies, $41,458.57 [T. Exhibit 40, 41] excepted),
were from loans and obligations strictly made by Carroll C.
Nichols.

(T. Ex. 16, T. Ex. 17, p. 411) also, (company loan

payable to Carroll Nichols $61,038.50)(T. Exhibits 31, 33, 35,
36, 39, 43, 44, 45, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, and 65)
To claim after the fact and not at trial thar she in
her own right as a creditor is entitled to some $40,000.00
from the joint bank account, because several thousand dollars
proceeded through the account, for the benefit of a defunct
corporate common motor carrier, which family account was
principally the embodiment of private and borrowed funds by
Carroll C. Nichols, does not give to Shirley Nichols an
outright benefit of half of the proceeds of said account used
10

t ii» |i.,iy the debts and obligations of the corporate enti.t\ , <"*.
G Transportation.
Further, Shirley Nichols could not be held liable on
l.ho .iccoiin! s at the Bank of Utah, Box Elder Credit Unioi1, Box
Elder County Bank, First Interstdt.e Hr.nil*( iind Fir si Security
Bank, (Exhibit 16) unless, in fact, she held contracted, by her
si griatiire thereon, to obligate herself personally for said
monies borrowed, extended, or credit granted,
therefore, supported by the evidence at trial and

s

s Inv that

she can noi be held liable to those from whom her husband
borrowed the funds, used for the benefit •>* ihe failed I us
company.

Therefore, she cannot claim the benefit of said

fiinds as alleged damages herein.
After careful consideration the trial court made
Findings of Fact number 50,

(R57 6-57 7)

Carroll C. Nichols, though husband of Shirley
Nichols, gave a large personal extension of
credit to the corporation prior to the Utah
Ridership Act, while Carroll C. Nichols was
President of the C & G Transportation
Corporation, for equipment in the form of
busses and vans. Shirley Nichols is neither
responsible for that debt, nor can she claim
any benefit therefrom as a claim for loss as a
creditor of the corporation by reason of being
Carroll's wife or the fact that most of the
proceeds from extension of credit by her
husband were processed though their joint
checking account. It may well be different if
this were a community property state.
11

The Court sustained the argument of the State of
Utah that by virtue of being a wife on a joint bank account in
this case, with its own set of facts, did not entitle Shirley
Nichols to half of the benefits or the proceeds that flowed
through the family account, it being with her knowledge and
concurrence, a mixed business and family account.

The court

also affirmed that Shirley Nichols would not have been liable
as a matter of law on the base obligations of Carroll Nichols
for repayment of the proceeds of the many loans.
Therefore, to state that Shirley Nichols was
entitled to one-half of the proceeds that had flowed through
the bank account is totally in error as a matter of law and
the judgment in her behalf May 31, 1990, should be sustained
as entered.
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the trial
court's findings and analysis were clearly erroneous.
Therefore, Plaintiff Shirley Nichols' judgment should not be
increased as urged by Plaintiffs.
II.

SHIRLEY NICHOLS IS NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW
ENTITLED TO $39,201.84 TO PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST.
A.

The Unfair Competition in Ridesharing Act
Does Not Allow for Pre-judgment Interest.

12

The statutory cause of action allows at most for the
recovery of a person's "losses" by reason of unfair
competition.

It is the States position here that this does

not include nor allows prejudgment interest,
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (3), the section under
which Plaintiffs have made their claims, is not designed or
intended to make the Plaintiffs "whole".
to "losses", not to "damages".

Claims are limited

This appears to exclude such

claims as future profits, lost opportunities, attorney's fees
and similar normal "damages" claims.

In addition, of course,

there is an outside limit of any recovery of $125,000.00,
again showing the limited nature of what a claimant can
recover.
The trial court also determined that the legislative
intent behind the act precluded prejudgment interest.

The

court noted that the act is silent as to prejudgment interest,
implying that it is not allowed.

Further, the Legislature

knew in limiting the recovery that the Plaintiffs would no
recover their full losses in any event - the Legislature was
allowing only a $125,000 recovery on Plaintiffs' $165,000.00
claim.

(See Conclusion of Law No. 5[a], Addendum at 2 ) .
It is clear that the Plaintiffs' recovery, if any,

was intended to be limited, as to amount ($125,000) as well as
13

the type of claim (losses).

Prejudgment interest is in

essence a measure of loss of a prospective advantage, or
opportunity costs, and is clearly the type of "damage" that
the Legislature intended to exclude where it limited the
recovery possible under the statue to "losses" not exceeding
$125,000,000
B.

Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Prejudgment
Interest Even if Authorized Under the
Unfair Competition in Ridesharing Act.

The trial court gave serious consideration to the
issue of prejudgment interest as claimed by the Appellants who
laid claim to original claims going back to the date of the
payment of the claim.

The trial court rejected any such

claims occurring prior to the enactment of the Ridership Act.
Finding of Fact # 17, Conclusion of Law #2, Addendum 2.

The

trial court also dismissed the claimed prejudgment interest of
the Nichols'.

Conclusion of Law #5, pp. 15-17, Addendum 2.

Shirley Nichols had no obligation on those corporate
bills, she was not obligated on any of the loans from which
the proceeds originated, and she, therefore, cannot claim that
amount as "losses".

These loans were the sole obligation of

Carroll C. Nichols.

Shirley Nichols' loss could only be

weighed and determined by the trial court from property or
money she personally had or lost based on a creditor-debtor
14

relationship with C & G Transportation-

That clearly was

limited to one-half of the proceeds of the second mortgage on
the house and 25^% of the proceeds of the family trust.

There

is no error by the trial court on the allegations as to
prejudgment interest.

See Finding of Fact No. 50, Addendum 2.

Of all the claimed losses, the amount of $165,384.92
was allowed at trial.

Amended Finding of Fact 41, Addendum 2

The findings, as amended, took into account all of the checks
that were produced at trial.

T. Exhibit 23-30

Various

adjustments were made, Exhibit S adjusted of the Nichols' post
trial brief, dated April 25, 1988,
Fact 1-41. (R 565-578)

and Amended Findings of

The Amended Findings of Fact dealt

with the disallowances set forth by exhibit number in summary
form, and did not allow any loss for which there was not proof
at trial as set forth in the trial transcript and the exhibits
produced at that time.

(emphasis ours) Addendum 2<f T. Exhibit

23-30.
This court has recently discussed when a party may
be entitled to pre-judgment interest in Canyon County Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).

This court stated, at p.

422:
This Court has repeatedly stated the law
in Utah as it applies to prejudgment
interest:
15

[W]here the damage is complete and the
amount of the loss is fixed as of a
particular time, and that loss can be
measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time -,. and
not from the date of judgment. On the
other hand, where damages are incomplete
or cannot be calculated with mathematical
accuracy, such as in the case of personal
injury, wrongful death, defamation of
character, false imprisonment, etc-, the
amount of the damages must be ascertained
and assessed by the trier of the fact at
the trial, and in such cases prejudgment
interest is not allowed.
The analysis in determining the
appropriateness of a prejudgment interest
award is whether a claim such as lost
profits is ascertainable with mathematical
accuracy. It is, of course, axiomatic
that all claims can be reduced eventually
to monetary value. All claims would
therefore at some point become liquidated
and theoretically subject to prejudgment
interest claims. Common sense precludes
such an interpretation, however.
In this case, we view the grocery store's
loss-of-profits damage as analogous to
damages awarded in wrongful death or
defamation cases and therefore
unliquidated. While the basis of the
"formula" used to determine Canyon
Country's lost profits may have been
sufficient for the jury to render a
verdict in favor of Canyon Country, it is
too speculative to allow for the addition
of prejudgment interest. The store was
not an established business with a longterm history of profits. It was open for
eipproximately fourteen months and never
made a net profit. Due to pending
foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings, it
is uncertain whether the store could have
stayed in business even had the insurance
16

claim been promptly paid. The purpose of
a prejudgment interest award is to
compensate a plaintiff for actual loss or
to prevent a defendant's unjust
enrichment. There was no unjust gain by
the insurers in this case, and with the
amount of uncertainty involved in
determining an actual loss, it would have
been inappropriate for the trial court to
allow for the addition of prejudgment
interest.
The test is also whether or not discretionary
factual analysis is needed to determine the exact amount of
the claim.

If so, the amount is not determinable

mathematically and without dispute and prejudgment interest is
improper.

As stated by the Washington Supreme Court in Segall

v. Ben's Truck Parts, Inc., 488 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1971):
Where trial court in an action to recover
value of service performed in design and
production of computer programs had to
exercise discretion as to what evidence to
give credit to and what amounts to use in
computations without reference to a
contractual standard of the parties,
denial of interest on amount due from time
obligation matured until judgment was
entered was proper.
In this case the trial court was forced to expend
considerable effort and discretion in unwinding the separate
claims of the parties, and their claim of separate losses.
The claimed amounts of the Plaintiffs were thus, in
contemplation of the rule on prejudgment interest,
unliquidated, speculative, and not subject to exact
17

formulation until the conclusion of the trial.

Therefore, the

trial court correctly found that prejudgment interest should
not be allowed in the case.

This finding and conclusion has

not been demonstrated to be wrong.

III. THE CLAIM BY PLAINTIFF SHIRLEY NICHOLS, AS SET
FORTH IN POINT III OF PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF (Page
31) IS A NON-MERITORIOUS CLAIM TO BE IGNORED BY
THIS COURT AS HAVING BEEN FIRST RAISED ON
APPEAL, AND FURTHER MIS-PRESENTED AS AN ALLEGED
BINDING ADMISSION AND COMMITMENT BY THE STATE.
Appellee State of Utah argues that a supposition
used by counsel in final argument at trial that a certain
imprecise amount of damages may be allowed as damages (i.e.
$58,07 7.64) if the court allows any separate amount to Shirley
Nichols, cannot be construed as an admission of judgment
against the state.

Further, the attorney for the State of

Utah cannot bind the State to any debt or fixed obligation.
As stated by the Montana Supreme Court in Brown by Brown v.
Markve, 700 P.2d 602 (Mont. 1985), at page 603:
In reviewing the Memo Opinion and Order of
the District Court, we find that the
district judge referred to the fact that
in closing argument, defense counsel
suggested to the jury that "a fair verdict
would be $30,000.00." The court then
concluded that this argument to the jury
had the legal effect of an admission
cigainst interest which set the lower
limits of the verdict at $30,000.00. No
citation of legal authority is cited for
18

that conclusion. In addition, the
conclusion of the trial court contradicts
its own Instruction No. 1 which in part
stated as follows: "Statements of counsel
are not to ge regarded by you as evidence
and you will disregard any such statements
which are not supported by the evidence
received upon this trial."
By this argument, the defense counsel
obviously sought to encourage the jury to
reach a lower verdict because of the
presence of an admission of liability on
the part of his client. However, that
suggestion cannot be classed as evidence
or an admission against interest which set
a floor of $30,000.00 below which the jury
could not go. The jury remained the
finder of fact with the right to set the
damages at $25,000.00 or such other figure
as the jurors might conclude to be
appropriate under the evidence.
Utah is the same.

There is no unilateral binding of

the State by its attorney, who in the context of argument,
makes such a statement.
).

(See Nichols' Brief p.

paragraph

In Gorgoza v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 553 P.2d 413

(Utah 19 76) the Court stated, at page 415:
The principle of law is sound that neither
defendant, nor his counsel can, by
stipulation, change the law or bind the
State contrary to law, or waive its rights
there under.
In the present case, there was no written
stipulation but a mere conjecture, in final argument, based on
partial evidence at trial put forth by Shirley Nichols as a
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"split the pie" argument for a larger share of the loss her
husband had suffered.
The trial court found no evidence for this claim of
$58,077,64 at trial or following remand from the Court of
Appeals.

Plaintiffs have not shown that factual determination

to be clearly erroneous.

Further, this is a non-meritorious,

near frivolous claim by Shirley Nichols that was not raised in
the court below and should be rejected out of hand.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
INTEREST FROM JUNE 20, 1988.
Plaintiffs' claim judgment interest from their first

judgment, entered June 20, 1988, on the apparent theory that
their current judgment, which they have appealed, is "better"
than their first judgment and, therefore, must "include" that
first judgment, which continues to bear judgment interest.
That claim and theory ignores the fact that that judgment was
reversed by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated
February 21, 1990.

See Addendum at 1.

An appeal only lies from a final judgment on appeal.
R. 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On appeal, the

appellate court can only affirm, reverse, or modify, or
otherwise dispose of a judgment.
Appellate Procedure.

R. 30, Utah Rules of

Plaintiffs mis-apprehend the nature of
20

the civil process to claim that only the "reasoning" of the
trial court was reverse, but not the judgment, by the Court of
Appeals,
This court specifically was held that a "reversal*
constitutes a "vacating" and a "setting aside" of a judgment,
rendering the judgment of no force or effect.

Further, on

remand, the trial court should put the parties into the
position as if no erroneous judgment had been entered.

Eckard

v. Smith, 545 P.2d 501 (Utah 1976)
The original judgment of June 20, 1988, was for a
"joint loss" of the Plaintiffs',

See Conclusion of Law #2,

Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law entered June 20 f 1988,
Rec. at 324,

The Court of Appeals ruled that conclusion of a

single joint claim was "erroneous", and not sustained by the
evidence.

The Court of Appeals remanded for a determination

of the "separate claims" of the Plaintiffs.
Court of Appeals, page 2, Addendum at 1.

See Opinion of

The claims of the

individual Plaintiffs were never determined until the present
judgments were entered.

The right, if any, to judgment

interest on the individual claims of the Plaintiffs stems from
the determination and entry of a judgment on the separate
claims - May 31, 1990 - not from a judgment on a claim that
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the Court of Appeal ruled never existed - the single court
claim of the Plaintiffs.
Therefore, if the Plaintiffs are entitled to
judgment interest, it can only run from the date of their
current and only outstanding judgment - May 31, 1990•
V,

THE LEGISLATION PRECLUDES ANY RECOVERY IN
EXCESS OF $125,000.00 BY STATUE AS A RECOVERY
FROM THE STATE ON THE JUDGEMENT GRANTED
PLAINTIFF CARROLL C. NICHOLS MAY 31, 1990.
The trial record shows what was behind the Unfair

Competition in Rideshare Statute,

The Act was passed in 1935

to assist Carroll C. Nichols to obtain redress if he were
within by its provisions.

As noted previously (see Point II) f

the legislation limits the types of claims as well as the
total amount of recovery,
The Legislature in 19 85 amended the Unfair
Competition Act to help rectify a problem created earlier
through passage of the Van Pool Act,

The size of the problem

was approximately $165,000 on the last day of the session the
Senate.

The final version of H.B. 210 included the Senate

imposed cap of $125,000.00.
The legislative intent to limit the Plaintiffs'
claims to $125,000 is very clear.
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The legislature clearly

intended to address the claims of Carroll and Shirley Nichols.
In the Senate report it states (T. Exhibit 22):
Senator Hillyard: . . . but there is only
one person that I know will qualify for
that, but you can't draft it for just one
person. If in fact there is recovery,
it's for the out of pocket money that he
would lose, not for profits, which is the
other thing he normally could recover,
because of governmental immunity and the
Legislature taking an action in it,
without really realizing that they were
driving a private businessman totally out
of business.
Senator Cornaby: Well, if it only affects
potentially one person, do we have an
estimate of how much that liability is?
Senator Hillyard: My understanding is the
maximum amount is $165,000 in the amount
of money that he has advanced. My belief,
too, is if there is found a violation, it
will probably be covered by insurance.
. . (T. Exhibit 22, p. 4, lines 24, 25,
26; p. 5, line 1)
Senator Soward: . . . and as I understand
we're only dealing with one person, but
you can't write a bill for one person—he
is entitled to restitution. And I support
it. (T. Exhibit 22, page 5, lines 18-21)
Senator Renstrom: . . . But I think the
strength of this bill is that in writing
it has to appear that it would cover
several, because to suggest that it's only
going to cover one would constitute a bill
of retainer, that [sic] would be
unconstitutional. So it has to be written
so that this gentleman or people in my
situation could sue. (T. Exhibit 22 p.
18, lines 16-21)
23

Senator Black: . . . The company says it
suffered in attempting to provide
transportation to and from Thiokol
Chemical Company of Box Elder County, C &
D [sic] Transportation Company presented
the Board with a claim for $164,963 in
damages as the amount the company says it
lost because van pools took away the
company's riders. . * . * (T. Exhibit 22 P.
19, lines 12-17)
The Senate and House discussion of the what was to become Utah
Code Ann. § 13-5-2.3 (1953) clearly shows that they were
trying to address the problem faced by the Nichols.
Clerk:
Mr. Speaker . . • the Senate has
this day passed, under suspension of the
Rules, and as amended by the House and
Senate, House Bill 210, Unfair Competition
in Ride-Sharing, by Representative Rob W,
Bishop. The bill is returned herewith for
further House action.
Speaker: Representative Bishop?. . .
David, would you like to briefly explain those?
Mr. (?): Yes
They merely, in the Senate, put a cap on
the amount that anyone could gain from any
one given lav/suit.
Speaker: Okay
Representatives, the motion is that we
concur in the Senate Amendments to House
Bill 210. (vote) . . .
Speaker:

The motion carries.

(T. Exhibit 21 page 18, lines 2 through 21)
1

(Emphasis added) Utah State Senate transcription from Gray
Audiograph tape recording of the Senate proceedings on House Bill
No. 210, Feb. 27, 1985.
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Carroll Nichols and his attorney were mentioned in
the bill several times and were responsible for getting the
bill introduced.

As far as the Legislature knew, the

Plaintiffs had lost approximately $165,000,00, the amount
declared twice in unsuccessful claims before the Board of
Examiners, and the Legislature felt that $125,000.00 would
help solve the problem for him and any others similarly
situated.
It is clear that the Legislature sought to allow a
"limited" recovery to the Plaintiffs if they could prove their
claim.

The legislature knew it was going to allow less than

the losses of the Plaintiffs, and chose to limit the total
amount of recovery to $125 f 000.00.

This limit applies to all

types of claims allowable, of whatever type.

This would

include interest claims - be that prejudgment interest if
allowed and post-judgment interest.

It makes no sense to say

that the legislature meant to limit the principal amount of
loss to $125,000, no matter now large the claim may be, but
then to allow interest on that $125,000 to increase the award.
The legislature set the limit of state liability, of whatever
basis, under the statute to $125,000.

Therefore, this court

should disallow post-judgment interest to the extent that
state liability would then exceed $125,000,00,
25

VI•

PLAINTIFFS' JUDGMENT SHOULD BE TOTALLY REVERSED
AS UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-2.3 (1986) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SPECIAL LEGISLATION PROHIBITED
BY ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTION.
This legislation was passed in the 1985 session of

the Utah State Legislature to solve an announced problem of
Carroll C. Nichols,
herein)

(T. Ex.'s 21 and 22, also, Point V

House and Senate deliberations on H.B. 210 (the Act)

show the specific intent was to provide a waiver to the
defense of immunity of the State of Utah, and provide a
specific way for Mr. and Mrs, Nichols to sue for recovery of
their alleged losses from a failed business-

(See citation to

detected herein in Point V, and T. Exhibit 21 and 22). There
was, and is, no one other than Plaintiffs, who could benefit
from this legislation.

This the Legislature cannot do.

Lauers v. City of Phoenix, 83 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1938),
quoting Southerlands St. Const. § 129, at p. 289, states, "If
a statute is plainly intended for a particular case and looks
to no broader application in the future, it is special or
local, and if such laws are prohibited, it is
unconstitutional."

Article VI, Section 26, Utah Constitution

prohibits Special Legislation.
The general law on this issue in Utah is set forth
in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance v. Utah Insurance Guaranteed
26

Ass'n., citation quoting State v.

Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94

P.2d 414 (1939), as follows:
State v. Kallas sets forth the Supreme
Court's general definition of general and
special laws:
A general law applies to and operates
uniformly upon all members of any class of
persons, places, or things requiring legal
action peculiar to themselves in matters
covered by the laws in question. On the
other hand, special legislation relates
either to particular persons, places or
things which, though not particularized,
are separated by an method of selection
from which the whole class to which the
law might, but for such legislation, be
applied.
Utah Farm Bureau goes on quoting People Western Fruit Growers,.
22 Cal.2d 494, 140 P-2d 13 (1943) pp. 19-20, stating:
It is special legislation if it compels
particular privileges or imposes special
disabilities, or burdensome conditions in
the exercise of a common right; upon a
class of persons arbitrarily selected from
the general body of those who stand in
precisely the same relation to the subject
of the law.
The legislation in question, Utah Code Ann. § 13-52.3 (1986) as amended, denoted "Uniform Competition in
Ridersharing" is such a piece of special legislation.

It

appears to be set out in language that is broad and generally
applying to any "common carrier" in the stated class.
However, as the record conclusively demonstrates, there were
27

only the Plaintiff who could or would benefit from the
legislation.
This statute is clearly designed to benefit only
these Plaintiffs, although the legislature wanted to avoid the
appearance of this reality*
cited in Point V, supra.

See comments of Senator Renstrom

As such, it is special legislation

prohibited by the Utah Constitution, and of no force or
effect.

Therefore, this Court should reverse the judgments

generated by the Court below and disallow any recovery by the
Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the legislation
that forms the basis for this action was unconstitutional
special legislation, and this Court should, therefore, reverse
and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the State of
Utah.

Failing that, this Court should deny the claims for

interest of the Plaintiffs, refuse to increase the amount of
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the judgments as requested by Plaintiffs, and affirm the
judgments as enteredDATED this

[^
day of November, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Ct)torney General

CNARD M. TANNER''
Assistant Attorney General

THOM D. ROBERTS
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 3c^)
day of
November, 1990, four copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent were mailed, first class postage prepaid, to the
following:
Robert B, Hansen
838 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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ADDENDUM 1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00-

p r\

First Interstate Bank of Utah,
Plaintiff,
v.
V

Cj

- ^ Of *~,* Court

Carroll C. Nichols and
Shirley Nichols,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication)
Case No.

v.

890308-CA

C. & G. Transportation
Corporation,
First Third-Party
Defendant,
v.
State of Utah,
Second Third-Party
Defendant.

Before Judges O r m e , Garff, and Davidson,
PER CURIAM:
This appeal is again before the Court following remand for
the entry of additional findings of fact. Appellants claim the
findings of fact, even as supplemented on remand, are
insufficient to support the conclusion of law that appellants
are entitled to a single joint claim under Utah Code Ann.
§ 13-5-2.3. W e agree and reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
This case was originally heard by the court pursuant to R.
Utah C t . A p p . 3 1 . Because the findings of fact did not explain
why M r . and M r s . Nichols, w h o in fact and in law are two
separate persons, were only entitled to a single joint claim,
we remanded the case for entry of such additional findings of

\J

o ^ ^«_»' JL

fact as the trial court desired to make in support of its
conclusion.
After the case was remanded, the court entered additional
findings of fact, in exactly the same form as were tendered by
the state, which do not clarify in any meaningful way why Mr.
and Mrs. Nichols are limited to a single joint claim. The new
findings do not state that the legislature intended to limit
Mr. and Mrs. Nichols to one $125,000 claim, nor is the finding
that the legislature intended to cap the recovery in any one
lawsuit at $125,000 supported by the evidence.
This court considers that the separate legal identity of
Mr. and Mrs. Nichols creates a prima facie showing that they
are each entitled to pursue whatever claims they individually
may have under section 13-5-2.3. The burden to show otherwise
shifts to the state. We conclude the state has not sustained
its burden of proving that Mr. and Mrs. Nichols are entitled to
a single joint claim.
Because the erroneous legal conclusion that the Nicholses
were entitled to a single joint claim precluded appropriate
consideration and scrutiny of the proper amount of their
respective claims, we remand to the trial court for a
determination of the amount of Mr. and Mrs. Nicholses' separate
claims and for entry of judgment in accordance therewith.
ALL CONCUR:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of March, 1990, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Remittitur was mailed to each of the
following:
Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Appellants
838 - 18th Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah
84103
R. Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
Bernard M. Tanner
Assistant Attorney General
Room 130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Third District Court
Salt Lake County
Case No. C85-2465

Julia C. Whitfield
Deputy Clerk 7
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March 14, 1990
REMITTITUR
First Interstate Bank of Utah,
Plaintiff,
v.
Carroll C. Nichols and
Shirley Nichols,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
C. & G. Transportation
Corporation,
First Third-Party
Defendant,
v.
State of Utah,
Second Third-Party
Defendant-

Case No,

890308-CA

&rs'£V6s~

This cause having been submitted, and the Court being
sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now ordered,
adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district court
be, and the same is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings<.

Issued:

February 21, 1990

Record:

6 volumes 1 envelope 1 box exhibits
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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)

I, Mary T. Noonan, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals,
certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and correct copy of the
Memorandum Decision
in the action entitled

First Interstate v. Nichols
now on file in my office.
In Testimony Whereof, I have set
ray hand and affixed the seal of
the Utah Court of Appeals.

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
By

Dated:

Julia Whitfield
Deputy Clerk
March 14, 1990

ADDENDUM 2

Thhd Jv?'j*C;ci! District

MAY 3 1 1990
(/
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R, PAUL VAN DAM #3312
Attorney General
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1019

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARROLL C- NICHOLS and SHIRLEY
NICHOLS,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENTS AND
MOTION FOR TRIAL COURT'S
ADOPTION THEREOF

Defendants and Third
Party Plaintiffs,
v.
C & G TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION,
First Third Party
Defendant,
v.

Civil No. C-85-2465
Judge James S. Sawaya

STATE OF UTAH,
Second Third Party
Defendant*

COMES NOW Bernard M. Tanner, Assistant Attorney General,
counsel for the State of Utah, Second Third Party Defendant
proposes the amended Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and
the Proposed Final Judgments thereon, and moves the trial Court
for adoption thereof pursuant to that certain remand, February
21, 1990, to the Third District Court from the Utah Court of
Appeals by Judges Orme, Davidson, and Garff.
Hereafter TR will be Trial Record and TR Exhibit

means

an exhibit received in evidence March 22 and March 23, 1988, at
trial.

TP will mean Transcript of Proceedings, March 22nd and

23rd, 1988.
The Findings of Fact are as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1-

The Claimants, Carroll and Shirley Nichols,

complied with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by serving
notice upon the State of Utah and the proper agencies thereof
through their counsel on or about the 31st day of May, 1985, and
June 6, 1985 respectively, TR Exhibits 1^9 and 20.
2.

C & G Transportation, Corporation was a

corporation organized by Greg Lee and Carroll C. Nichols
incorporated on the 25th day of June, 1980, for the purpose of
operating as a common carrier, to transport passengers to and
from Thiokol in Box Elder County Utah.

—2—
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3.

C & G Transportation Corp. bought A & C Bussing

Company, a common carrier, certificate #1995, on July 2, 1980,
and on that same day applied for expanded Public Service
Commission authority.
4.

Tariffs for the aforesaid transportation services

were duly filed on October 27, 1980 and August 9, 1981.
5.

On the 15th day of September, 1980, the aforesaid

corporation duly received Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity No. 2009 authorizing it to transport passengers to and
from Thiokol's facilities in Box Elder County from various
locations in that county and also Davis, Weber, Box Elder and
Cache Counties.
6.

On February 2, 1981 the C & G Transportation

Corporation applied to the Public Service Commission for amended
tariffs, which were granted March 31, 1981.
7*

Prior to enactment of the Ridership Act, C & G

Transportation Corporation and Carroll C. Nichols individually,
had obligated themselves for busses and vans in the operation of
the business in the amount of $159,683.00 (See attachment A to
Findings of Fact and TR Exhibit 3_3 of Trial Record) .
8*.

After enactment of the Ridership Act, effective

May 12, 1981, the Corporation and Carroll C. Nichols obligated
themselves for an additional bus on June 17, 1981, for $9,103.00.

-3-

9.

On May 13, 1981, Carroll C- Nichols and Shirley

Nichols (TR Exhibit _41) borrowed $69,000-00 from First Security
Bank of Utah in Brigham City, Utah on a second mortgage, of which
$22,599.45 was paid to the Box Elder County Bank and $46,400-55
was retained by the Nichols and used as either investment in C &
G Transportation Corporation or to pay obligations of the
Corporation,
10-

On January 3, 1984, Carroll C. Nichols and Shirley

Nichols sold their home and from the proceeds, on a settlement
statement dated January 3, 1984, effective January 1, 1984, paid
$68,607-05 to First Security Bank to retire in full the second
mortgage of May 13, 1981 and obtain a release thereof. (TR
Exhibit 40)
11.

After the enactment of the Utah Ridesharing Act,

codified at Utah Code Annotated §§ 54-11-1 through 54-11-10 (1953
as amended), the Division of Public Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation, received complaints from C & G
Transportation, Corporation, Lewis Brothers Stages and others
concerning van pools authorized by the aforesaid act, taking away
their passengers.
12.

Neither the Division of Public Utilities nor C & G

Transportation, Corporation had or obtained any legal remedy to
prevent van pools from charging lesser fares than the applicable
tariff rates for transportation by C & G Transportation,
Corporation, a common carrier.
-4-

13.

The third party plaintiffs are victims of unfair

competition within the meaning of the Unfair Practices Act, at
Utah Code Annotated § 13-5-2.3 (1953 as amended).
14.

Third party plaintiffs were injured because they

were creditors of C & G Transportation Corporation, a common
carrier, certificated by the Public Service Commission under
Certificate 2009 on September 15, 1980.
15.

Third party plaintiffs as creditors of C & G

Transportation Corporation suffered losses by reason of unfair
competition.
16.

Recovery for the third party plaintiffs is limited

to $125,000 per claim due to House Bill 210, (1985) codified at
Utah Code Annotated § 13-5-2.3 (1953 as amended)
17.

The losses claimed as a result of the extension of

credit to the common carrier, C & G Transportation Corporation,
as a result of the 1981 Van Pool Act but occurring prior to the
enactment of the Legislation, (See TR Exhibit ^3) cannot be part
of any claimed loss by the third party plaintiffs, and are hereby
rejected (see addendum #A, to the findings).
18.

The claimed creditor debtor relationship with the

corporation on the loan payoff of check #330, dated November 17,
1981 (TR Exhibit !23J , to Murray Nichols for $7,000.00 was
personal between Carroll Nichols and Murray Nichols and is
rejected as part of the claimed loss on the part of Plaintiff

Carroll C. Nichols as a creditor of C & G Transportation
Corporation as there was no proof at trial of the corporate
obligation on this $10,000.00 note.
19.

The claimed losses from a creditor debtor

relationship with the corporation on the loan payoff on a
promissory note between Carroll C. Nichols and Shirley Nichols
and Blaine Wilcox as evidenced by checks #450, dated February 5,
1982 on TR Exhibit 2!5 for $1,000.00 and check #59, dated May 5,
1982, TR Exhibit _27_f for $1,000.00, are rejected as to both
parties Plaintiffs' as said promissory note was personal to the
Carrolls' and the evidence is insufficient to establish a
creditor relationship with the C & G Transportation Corporation
on said $10,000.00 note to be included as a loss due to the Utah
Ridesharing Act.
20.

All post trial appellant exhibits not a part of

Plaintiffs post trial brief filed April 25, 1988 but filed on
appeal by Plaintiffs are rejected.
21.

The claims for pre-judgment interest on all

alleged losses of Plaintiffs from May 12, 1981, through Judgment
of The Third District Court on June 20, 1988, on behalf of
Carroll C. Nichols are not allowed as a measure of loss or
damages. (See paragraphs #15a and #15b, statutory interpretation
and conclusions of law at pages 15 and 16 hereafter)

22.

The claimed interest by Shirley Nichols on her

alleged losses by reason of:
a-

The First Security Bank loan proceeds on a second

mortgage dated May 13, 1981,
b.

26% of the amount used for the benefit of the

corporation from the Carroll C. Nichols Family Partnership and
c.

the alleged claimed loss of interest on the $2,000-00

repayed on the Blaine Wilcox promissory note are all rejected as
a measure of damages or loss pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §
13-5-2-5(3) (1953 as amended)23.

The claimed loss of Shirley Nichols as a creditor

of C & G Transportation Corporation, as set forth on Plaintiffs'
Exhibit S, to Post Trial brief (filed April 25, 1988) named
"Amended Computation of Losses" (undated) at paragraph #1 for
$46,046-51 as 1/2 of the principal loss from the joint bank
account is rejected as to
24.

principal and interest-

The claimed loss of Shirley Nichols on the above

Exhibit S, to Post Trial Brief (April 25, 1988) computation (a
two page document), at paragraph 3, in the amount of $3,211-88 is
granted as to the principal amount only25.

The claimed loss of Shirley Nichols on the

document referred to in paragraph 23 above, at paragraph 7,
therein, in the amount of $34,303-52 is accepted as a loss to her
as to the principal amount only.

-7-

26.

Third party plaintiffs' $22,000 claimed advance to

the common carrier from the family partnership is limited as to
their claim to 52% of the total sum advanced as that is their
combined interest as general partners in the Carroll C. Nichols
Family Partnership (TR Exhibit 6j^, TP 192).
27.

Prior to the passage of the Ridership Act, March

11, 1981, effective May 12, 1981, C & G Transportation
Corporation had purchased 11 of its 12 vehicles for a cost of
$159,683.00 (TR Exhibit _33) .

Said purchases were made both by

the corporation and Carroll Nichols individually and as
guaranteed by Carroll Nichols.
28.

The $9,103.00 for the purchase of the Flexible

Flyer Bus, on June 17, 1981 is accepted as a creditor loss by
Carroll C. Nichols as it was subsequent to the effective date of
the Utah Ridesharing Act of May 13, 1981. (TR Exhibit 33)
29.

Carroll Nichols was president and stockholder of C

& G Transportation Corporation from its inception on June 25,
1980, until he sold his interest in the corporation to his sonin-law on February 15, 1982, for $5,000, reserving to himself
obligations in the amount of $133,900 with the agreement the vans
and busses would be sold and the proceeds therefrom going to the
corporation. (TR Exhibit 16).
30.

Carroll C. Nichols is not allowed a claim for both

$9,103.00 in paragraph 28 and a loss for the $133,900.00 on TR

Exhibit 1^6, so this is recognized by the court as a claimed loss
of only $124,797.00 to be adjusted by bank losses not included in
the reserved debts from TR Exhibit Ij6 on equipment purchased, as
evidenced by TR Exhibit 33.
31.

Third party plaintiffs' claim at the time of the

passage of House Bill 210 (1985), now known as Utah Code
Annotated §13-5-2.3, (1953 as amended), was $164,963 (TR Exhibit
22, page 19, line 15).
32.

Van pools operating due to the Utah Ridesharing

Act, Chapter 273, Laws of Utah 1981, passed March 11, 1981,
effective May 12, 1981, and now known as Utah Code Annotated
§§ 54-11-1, thru 54-11-10, (1953 as amended), were charging
prices lower than the tariffs approved for C & G Transportation
Corporation and also lower even after C & G Transportation
Corporation had a 17% increase in their tariffs granted on July
20, 1981, by the Public Service Commission.
33.

The claims alleged herein arose prior to March 29,

34.

The claim of Carroll C. Nichols third party

1984.

plaintiff herein, exceeded the statutory limit of $125,000.

The

claim of Shirley Nichols does not exceed the statutory limit of
$125,000.00.
35.

The alleged loss on TR Exhibit 2^ of $38,271.67 is

reduced by $7,000.00 - check #330, and also $8,300.00 as no
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checks for those amounts were produced; also by all amounts
listed before May 13, 1981 equaling $12,523.00 leaving a new
subtotal of $10,000.73.
36.

As to TR Exhibit Z4, the alleged loss of

$22,630.88, is reduced by the total amount of $3,399.03,
representing four checks 381, 390, 416, and 434, which were not
produced in evidence, for a subtotal of $19,231.85.
37.

As to TR Exhibit 2J3 the alleged loss of $8,771.00

is reduced by $938.11 representing checks 443, 480, and 483,
which were not produced at trial for a subtotal of $7,833.06.
38.

As to TR Exhibit 21_ t^ie alleged loss is reduced by

Check #59 dated May 4, 1982, to Blaine Wilcox in the amount of
$1,000.00 leaving a subtotal total loss of $9,554.60.
39.

As to TR Exhibit 2J^ the alleged loss is reduced by

$633.78 as checks #2772, March 12, 1986, for $333.78 and check
#184, March 21, 1987, for $300.00 were not produced at trial
leaving a subtotal loss of $90,351.73.
40.

As to TR Exhibit 3J3 the alleged loss is reduced by

$500.00, check #851 dated August 30, 1980 as that was before the
passage of the Utah Ridesharing Act, May 12, 1981, leaving a
subtotal of $926.51.
41.

The total of TR Exhibits 23 through 3j0 is

$165,384.92 which includes the alleged loss on the home when
sold. ($86,000.00, TR Exhibit 2!9, line 15, item dated January 3,
1984) .
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42.

The amount of $1,426.51 (less $500.00) is included

in the alleged claim of third party plaintiffs as set forth in TR
Exhibit 30.
43.

Shirley Nichols assisted minimally in C & G

Transportation Corporation doing some book work, but most of it
being done by Teresa, her daughter (TR page 157, line 11).
44.

Shirley Nichols was not very knowledgeable about

the books and records of the corporation (TR page 158, lines 1819).
45.

There is only one claim for loss, shared by

Plaintiffs; (emphasis mine) as a result of mortgaging the home
for $69,000 on a second mortgage in May 1981 and paying the
amount of $68,607.05 to retire the second mortgage from the
proceeds of the sale when the home was sold to pay an approximate
$69,000 obligation to First Security Bank, each party Plaintiffs
claims 1/2 that amount.

(TR page 154, lines 2-7, and page 159,

lines 13-25; also TR Exhibit 40^ dated January 3, 1984).
46.

C & G Transportation Corporation's bankruptcy

filing (TR Exhibit 5>, page 4 of bankruptcy schedule A - 3 ) , shows
an alleged debtor's obligation to Shirley Nichols of $86,055.28.
47.

On Exhibit 5, page 4, of the bankruptcy filing of

C & G Transportation Corporation, Schedule A-3, the corporation
shows an alleged debtor's obligation to Carroll C. Nichols of
$128,500.
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On said settlement statement (TR Exhibit jyL) the

purchasers of the home assumed the first mortgage of $10,786.57
which may not be claimed as a loss by third party plaintiffs, on
TR Exhibit 29 and also on TR Exhibit 41.
49.

C & G Transportation Corporation's books showed a

negative amount on the companies capitol account of $39,826.00 in
April, 1980, and a net loss of $30,583.36 on the Davis and Bott
financial statement of February 28, 1981, before May 12, 1981,
the effective date for enactment of the Ridesharing Act (TP
246.)(TR Exhibit IT)

Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff,

Carroll C. Nichols was on notice from the letter from the Box
Elder County Bank (which was merged into First Interstate Bank)
that the business was unprofitable as of March and April of 1981.
The Small Business Administration had turned down Nichols' loan
request as the SBA did not think the C & G Transportation
Corporation "could show a profit" (see Exhibit A to Defendants
Affidavit in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment dated
December 31, 1986, filed with the Court in First Interstate's
suit against Carrol C. Nichols, a copy of said letter and Motion
received by the Attorney General's Office January 2, 1987).
50.

Carroll C. Nichols, though husband of wife Shirley

Nichols, gave a large personal extension of credit to the
corporation prior to the Utah Ridership Act, while Carroll C.
Nichols was President of the C & G Transportation Corporation,
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for equipment in the form of busses and vans,

Shirley Nichols is

neither responsible for that debt nor can she claim any benefit
therefrom as a claim for loss as a creditor of the corporation by
reason of being Carrolls' wife or the fact that most of the
proceeds from extension of credit by her husband were processed
though their joint checking account-

It may well be different if

this were a community property state.
51.

Carroll C. Nichols7 claim (TR Exhibit 31)(also

Exhibit S to Third Party Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief) for loss
of principle and interest and attorney fees in the amount of
$49,521.97 because of a judgment obtained against him, to be yet
paid to First Interstate Bank, on money used for the benefit of C
& G Transportation Corporation is disallowed, as the obligation
upon which judgment was obtained was executed prior to May 12,
1981, when the Utah Ridesharing Act was effective.

(see

promisory note dated July 23, 1980, Exhibit "B" to Defendant and
Third Party Plaintiffs' affidavit dated December 31, 1986.)
52.

The $3,948.24 to First Security Bank (TP 257,

258)(See page 2 of trial exhibit on damages, unnumbered, undated
filed by Plaintiff as Exhibit S to Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief,
items one and two on page 2 is allowed.
53.

The Division of Public Utilities had an

enforcement policy against those who operated van pools before
the Utah Ridership Act and a "no enforcement" policy against such
additional van pools set up after that act was in force.
-13-
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54.

Before May 12, 1981 and afterwards, the

percentages of passenger capacity for C & G Transportation
Corporation utilization never exceeded 50%.

C & G Transportation

Corporation before and after the enactment of the Utah Ridership
Act sustained substantial losses, and went out of business a few
months after February 1982.
55.

C & G Transportation Inc. did not repay the

aforesaid loans and as a result Carroll and Shirley Nichols
jointly lost over $125,000.00f

the

statutory limit per clalmr

and

said losses were due to unfair competition from van pools
operating under Chapter 11 of Title 54, U.C.A. 1953.
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACTS, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Third Party Plaintiffs were creditors of C & G

Transportation, Inc., a common carrier of passengers, after May
12, 1981.
2.

Third Party Plaintiff, Carroll C. Nichols suffered

a loss of $134,711.78

subsequent to May 12, 1981, as a result of

unfair competition due to the Utah Ridesharing Act of 1981, which
loss is in excess of the $125,000.00 allowed as a potential
recovery permitted by the enactment of House Bill 210 (Laws of
Utah 1985) at Utah Code Annotated § 13-5-2.3(3) (1953 as
amended).
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3.

Third Party Plaintiff, Shirley Nichols suffered a

loss of $41,458-57, (Exhibit S, Third Party Plaintiffs' Post
Trial Brief (April 25, 1988) as adjusted)(attached) less than the
$125,000.00 allowed as a potental recovery permitted by the
enactment of House Bill 210 (Laws of Utah 1985) Utah Code
Annotated § 13-5-2.3(3) (1953 as amended).

Said loss occured by

reason of unfair competition from van pools as defined in Utah
Code Annotated § 13-5-2.3(1)(c) (1953 as amended) as a result of
their operations in competition to Plaintiffs under Chapter 11,
Title 54 Utah Code Annotated.
4.

That pursuant to Exhibits _21^ and 22 of the trial

record, the records of the House and Senate respectively, it is
hereby found that the legislative intent was to "put a cap on the
amount anyone could gain from any one given lawsuit" (TR Exhibit
21, page 18, lines 16-25).
5.

As to Finding of Fact #21, (page 6 ) , a mixed

question of law and fact and statutory interpretation, it is
further concluded on the issue of Prejudgment interest as
follows:
a.

As to statutory construction and legislative

intent on House Bill 210, Laws of Utah 1985, I find there must be
a total denial to Defendant and Third Party Plaintiffs' of prejudgment interest.

The court gives effect to the legislature's

underlying intent, and holds that each term in the statute was
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(V.

used advisedly.

Section 13-5-2.3(2) and (3) was debated with the

legislators' full understanding of the possible maximum claim
which Nichols would seek to recover (approximately $164,000).

In

light of their understanding and knowledge, they set the maximum
limit at $125,000 per claim.

The statute is silent on the

subject of prejudgment interest and such silence reveals the
intent that the total amount of recovery cannot exceed $125,000.
Lacking a statutory provision authorizing payment of prejudgment
interest in addition to the $125,000 maximum, it is here further
concluded that

the "recovery from the state the amount of those

losses not exceeding $125,000 per claim" means exactly what it
says.

A proper construction of statutory terms must further the

statute's purpose.

The statute's purpose was to limit recovery

to $125,000.
b.

Traditionally, a judgment creditor cannot

claim interest prior to the time the debt becomes due and
certain.

When a judgment is reversed on appeal, interest on the

new judgment subsequently entered by the trial court accrues
interest on from the date of entry of that new judgment.

Mason

v. Western Mtq. Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988)

Pre

judgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due to
the opposing party's delay in tendering an amount owing under an
obligation or debt.
App. 1987).

Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah

(There is no delay here on the part of the State of

Utah as it relates to the established debt.)
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The language of Utah Code Annotated §13-5-2.3 is clear that
a plaintiff cannot recover, and the state has no liability, until
the plaintiff has obtained a "successful adjudication".

In other

words, the Nichols are not entitled to recover any amount until a
judgment is rendered in his or her favor.
until the court so declares«.
nonexistent debt!

The state owes no debt

Interest cannot accrue on a

Interest cannot begin to run until the

plaintiff has a right to the money.

The amount of loss is not

fixed until adjudicatedf and prejudgment interest is not allowed
in such cases.

Bjork v. April Industries, Inc. 560 P.2d 315

(Utah 1977) cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
Utah law allows post judgment interest to accrue from the
date of the Judgment.

Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule

32 states:
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a
judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, any interest allowed by law shall
be payable from the date the judgment was
entered in the district court....

6.

Judgment should be entered in favor of Third Party

Plaintiff, Carroll C. Nichols for the sum of $125,000.00.

pv^rsi-

7.

Judgment should be entered in favor of Third Party

Plaintiff, Shirley Nichols for the sum of $41,458-57.

DATED this

<s* /

day of

y*^^7

1989

JAME^-S. SAWAYA
District Court Jud
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs

BERNARD M. TANNER
Attorney for Second Third Party
Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

day of April,

1990, a copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law and Proposed Final Judgments and Motion for
Trial Court's Adoption Thereof and Judgment was delivered to
Robert B, Hansen, Attorney at Law, 838 18th Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah
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